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



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Nato stands firm on missiles decision

only forestall missile modernisation by being determined to go ahead with it if need be.

This position was first stipulated by former Bonn Chancellor Helmut Schmidt. To call it unnecessarily into question, as some members of Herr Schmidt's party, the Social Democrats, are now doing, is to harm Nato and to encourage the Russians to mark time in Geneva.

If, instead, Moscow came to terms with Nato's stand and President Reagan's call for the withdrawal of all nuclear missiles from Europe, it could make a contribution toward better understanding between the blocs.

The bull is in Moscow's court. It is up to Mr Andropov to go through the motions after talking in such cordial terms of detente.

The Nato countries, as part of their frank outlook, both internal and external, remain sceptical. The West is deeply disappointed by Soviet behaviour.

That is why mention is made in the communiqué of the oppression of the Afghan people by the Soviet Union and of Moscow's reluctance to accept a political solution that would end their suffering.

The situation in Poland is likewise



Bonn meeting

Making a point, American Secretary of State George Shultz (left) with Chancellor Kohl in Bonn. Mr Shultz was making a European tour for talks on a wide range of issues.

greatly at odds with the Helsinki accords, of which the Soviet Union was a co-signatory.

Even the suspension of martial law in Poland is unlikely to alter the fact that the Polish people are deprived of civil rights.

So the Soviet Union has ample, opportunity, not only in Geneva but also in Warsaw and Kabul, of showing by deeds and constructive proposals that it is keen on detente and disarmament.

The key to understanding is in Moscow. Mr Andropov has yet to turn it in the lock.

(Nordwest Zeitung, 11 December 1982)

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Uproar as American emergency plans are revealed

There was an intense reaction at the Nato foreign ministers' meeting in Brussels to a report in a British newspaper that the Americans are thinking of transferring their European command HQ from Stuttgart to London. The report, in *The Guardian*, London, was promptly denied strongly in Washington and Bonn. But later an American forces spokesman confirmed that in a war, some of the command functions would be transferred to Britain.

The intensity of the reaction showed how many sore points the *Guardian's* report raised.

For years widespread mistrust has arisen from claims that the Americans have long realised that continental Europe could not possibly be defended in a war.

The Americans are also said to be planning to limit a nuclear war to Western Europe so as to shield their own cities from a Soviet nuclear strike.

The general implication is that the United States is pulling out gradually with a view to fighting, if need be, until the last European but to saving America's own skin.

The transfer of the US headquarters in Europe would fit neatly into the picture.

The hue and cry it prompted show that the Nato foreign ministers in Brussels have painted too pretty a picture of North Atlantic realities.

Last August, when it was learnt that the Americans wanted to transfer US divisions nearer to the ODR border to demonstrate their forward strategy, Bonn was worried the Soviet Union might feel this was a provocation.

German authorities would feel it was a far too drastic step in the other direction if the Americans were now to quit their European headquarters in Stuttgart.

In today's missile age a few hundred miles one way or the other hardly matter. The optical impression is what counts.

A US withdrawal to Britain could look like the surrender of territory that America cannot hold on to.

If the deterrent is to be fully credible, thought must be devoted in time to an alternative HQ from which military leadership can continue to be provided.

That in itself is neither dramatic nor abnormal. If, however, the reports are based on a confidential Pentagon report it would be further proof of Defence Secretary Weinberger's ineptitude in dealing with his allies.

A few months ago Mr Weinberger wanted to dissuade them from selling pipeline to the Soviet Union by threatening US troop withdrawals.

The foreign ministers in Brussels demonstrated a uniform firmness and readiness to talk. What they said was aimed mainly at the new man in the Kremlin, Yuri Andropov.

Their aim was to convince him that the only way to stop Nato missile modernisation is to meet the West half-way in Geneva.

The foreign ministers feel the missile modernisation threat aspect of the December 1979 Nato missiles-and-talks resolution is still fully effective.

All that worries them is the possible strength of opposition to it by Western public opinion.

This point, the one that annoys them, could encourage the Soviet government to feel that US missile modernisation might be stymied without counter-concessions and solely by means of popular unrest in the West.

It will be less than a year before we know for sure who was right in assessing the pressure and counter-pressure.

Doubts and differences of opinion within Nato were adroitly concealed in the pleasing framework of a detailed Nato communiqué.

The North Atlantic pact is not so united as to enable one to rely implicitly on missile modernisation going ahead if the Geneva missile talks break down.

(Central-Anzeiger Bonn, 11 December 1982)

WORLD AFFAIRS

Outsiders look for signs that Bonn is maintaining stability as the keynote

The circumstances surrounding the change of government in Bonn have caused profound alarm abroad. It is not the fact that the Christian Democrats have returned to power, although that is worrying some people who are concerned about ties with the East.

The event that is causing the most concern is the general election scheduled for 6 March. Many are taking it as a sign of weakness and are wondering if it will leave no one with a clear majority.

It is causing concern because the Federal Republic of Germany has long been regarded as a model of domestic stability.

People have grown used to Bonn being one of the few reliable factors in world affairs.

Other European countries might vacillate but Germany was always reliable, predictable and consistent in its foreign policy.

There are other factors involved: the very fact that Helmut Schmidt was ousted although his government had not been defeated at the polls mystified a lot of people.

Then come the disputes within the SPD; the successes of the Greens and their allied alternative groupings at the polls; and the doings of the peace movement. All are causing concern.

"Will the Federal Republic of Germany now turn into a second Italy?" the writer was recently asked by a South American.

Such doubts take us by surprise. We must, of course, bear in mind that the general public in more distant countries learns little about German domestic affairs.

Even among people interested in political developments in Europe, knowledge is strictly limited. So misinterpretations are virtually inevitable.

The ouster of Helmut Schmidt by a Bundestag majority came as a profound shock. Foreign opinion is at a loss to understand how a Bonn Chancellor held in generally high repute could be replaced overnight, as it were, by a man whose name one first had to learn.

This fact alone created the impression that conditions in the Federal Republic were at sixes and sevens.

If the outgoing Bonn government had lost its majority at the polls people would have been surprised but would at least have understood.

But the idea of a Chancellor being ousted in mid-term by a sitting Bundestag was so unusual as to create alarm.

Three other trends have compounded matters: the disputes within the SPD, the successes of the Greens and alternative political groupings at the polls and the showing of the peace movement.

These trends are taken as a matter of course, to have something to do with the change of government in Bonn.

In other continents the last TV news footage from Germany before the change of government was in many cases the major demonstration by the peace movement.

The impression conveyed was that the Bonn government faced a powerful, irresistible mass movement.

In better-informed circles the success of the Greens, or ecologists, at the polls

in a number of Länder has given rise to alarm.

In a number of cases people have registered the fact that political stalemate has resulted in some Länder. The idea of a "hung parliament" is promptly applied to Bonn.

The new government's decision to hold a mid-term poll six months after assuming power is taken to be a sign of weakness and people are wondering whether it having might not result in no one with a clear majority, as happened in Hamburg and Hesse.

This is what causes most alarm abroad.

People have grown accustomed to Bonn's stability.

This was all the more important as it seemed to ensure a high degree of political continuity in the European Community.

It has led to correspondingly serious alarm in case both Bonn and Western Europe fall into a state of stalemate and domestic uncertainty.

The specific worries vary from country to country. In the United States, or at least in Washington, the big worry is that Bonn might be unable next year to carry out by the Nato resolution to sta-

tion medium-range US missiles in Germany.

Elsewhere, in the southern hemisphere, people are worried that Bonn, and with it the EEC, might no longer be able to play a responsible role in international economic affairs.

This comes at a time when many countries, mainly because of pressing foreign debts, urgently need help, so it is alarming.

This may all seem, to us, wildly exaggerated. It is due for the most part to scanty information and gross misinterpretation.

But facts do not alone matter in politics. What people believe to be facts and the views they hold are equally important.

That is not to say that the change of government in Bonn should never have occurred. It was, when all is said and done, legitimate and in strict accordance with democratic rules.

Nor is it to say that a general election ought not to be held in March, much though the idea might irritate foreign opinion.

Yet these views, encountered abroad, demonstrate the responsibility we owe to the world at large.

We must not, of course, overestimate

The transatlantic political climate has eased. Relations between Bonn and Washington have relaxed a little. The dispute over steel exports to the United States has been settled. President Reagan has lifted the sanctions imposed in connection with the Siberian gas pipeline contract.

George Shultz at the State Department is not as obvious a presence as his predecessor, Mr Haig.

Mr Shultz is keen to rely on tried and trusted confidential diplomacy. The impression he conveys may be a little boring but his Quiet American approach could well prove the more effective.

Yet alienation remains. The atmosphere may have improved but views contrast starkly on matters of substance. Secretary of State Shultz's Bonn visit, the first step on an extended European tour, failed to bridge this contrast, which is due mainly to differences in assessment of the Soviet Union's role.

While Bonn advocates an outstretched hand policy toward Moscow, Washington advises scepticism.

While Bonn is immediately prepared to receive positive signals from the East, US monitoring stations convey a less sensitive impression.

America wants to see actions in, say, Poland or Afghanistan. To use Mr Shultz's term, the United States wants to quit the signals business and wait for something more substantial.

This is the background against which recent commercial quarrels in the West must be seen.

America may have given up its resistance to the Soviet gas pipeline under construction between Siberia and Western Europe but that cannot be said to signify US approval.

Washington, US officials say time and again, is still against the scheme. But under Mr Shultz at the State De-

Shultz's quiet approach might just work

partment a pragmatic view has prevailed.

What Washington now wants is something else. It wants America's allies to adopt a joint economic outlook toward the Soviet Union, an overall concept on trade with the East.

Talks have been held in the US capital with the four European gas pipeline countries (Britain, France, Italy and the Federal Republic of Germany) and with Canada, Japan and the European Community.

It has been agreed that a closer look must be taken at the problem within the West, although the project is a vague one, outlined in a non-paper, or unofficial document, and wide open to interpretation.

So, different parties to the talks have gained different impressions, and views vary widely on what and how. The aim of Mr Shultz's visit was to press ahead with the project as the United States say it.

America would dearly like to reach firm agreement on something specific at the May 1983 Western economic summit in Williamsburg, Virginia.

Others are already balking. France, for instance, fears inroads into the sovereignty of its trading policy.

The Reagan administration needs agreement in place of the gas pipeline sanctions. At the same time Mr Shultz has adopted the East-West ideology of his lord and master.

President Reagan's views on the subject began with the simple question:

the international importance of the Federal Republic, which is a small country in international terms.

Politicians have at times been about the Federal Republic being for trading power. This has done harm than good.

It is nonetheless remarkable much importance in other countries placed on the domestic stability and political reliability of Germany.

The prospect of either being seen as a serious upset, especially in view of its repercussions on Europe.

Viewed in this light, the existing Bonn government capable of even greater importance, and reasons with Hamburg or Hesse are leading.

Political stalemate in Hamburg for six months or so is regarded not a serious problem.

A corresponding stalemate in Bonn would be a political catastrophe, especially because of the deep economic tension has mounted in the national economic system.

The Federal Republic must at all times remain capable of action beyond March, if only because of its Council responsibilities (Bonn will take over the Council of Ministers in the Year).

One can but hope that voters will appreciate this need and ensure that the Bonn government is given a clear majority at the polls.

If the election fails to produce a clear majority after this scope of responsibility they hold. Any election would then be better than none.

Wolfgang W. (Hannoversche Allgemeine, 4 December 1982)

"Why should we invest billions of arms build-up against the Soviet Union when we bolster the Soviet system the same time by means of further loans in trade and credit facilities?"

Europe is naturally keen to see American grain shipments to the Soviet Union included in the overall context. An influential European school of thought feels the Soviet Union is reduced more by food shipments than anything else.

It remains to be seen whether Shultz will return from Europe with more than fine words and complete the world today is no longer what it was in the 1950s.

Due to geography and the need to come to terms in peace with its Soviet neighbour, Western Europe has evolved interests of its own.

They are more complex than America's. Within the Atlantic alliance give rise to lasting tensions, tensions which we look like having to live with.

Horst Schreitter-Schwarz (Frankfurter Rundschau, 9 December 1982)

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HOME AFFAIRS

Kohl seeks to lose a vote and win an election

Handelsblatt

Chancellor Kohl intends to ask the Bundestag for a confidence vote. He wants to lose it.

He has told the Federal President, Carstens, that he wants to do this on election on 6 March.

A Constitution does not allow the Chancellor to dissolve parliament himself to dissolve parliament himself.

President Carstens is expected to support the proposal for a no confidence vote within 21 days, and the way is open for the election.

The question now is: what can the Chancellor do in the interim between election and an election?

The Chancellor has full scope under the Constitution, but it makes full use of this scope a difficult question that this government has to answer.

The Bundestag continues to exist and after its dissolution — as contained in all might be to the man-in-

Article 69 of the Constitution provides the Chancellor and his cabinet in office until a new Bundestag assumes its duties.

Asked by the President, the Chancellor is under obligation to stay in office. If the ministers are asked to stay they must, until a new Chancellor is appointed.

The Constitution has no provisions to limit the caretaker government's scope. And since the budget for fiscal 1983 is likely to have already been passed at the time of the dissolution of the government is under no obligation to suspend the previous year's provision applies for any German government — regardless whether caretaker one or not.

The head of government, the Chancellor, is under no obligation to suspend the previous year's provision applies for any German government — regardless whether caretaker one or not.

Among FDP sympathisers there is a three-quarter majority in favour of the

general secretary of the Free Democrats, Imgard Adam-Schwaet, to the party's fortunes are on the decline.

In polls, disagree: they say it will only about 2 per cent of the vote in the Hamburg election this year and about 3 per cent in the general election in March.

Of course, voting decisions are made on the day, so, despite its precarious position, the FDP can keep on going. But even if everything runs well it is not likely to come anywhere near 100 per cent of the poll it got in 1980.

The wool FDP voters are estimated at a maximum of three per cent. Those who in 1980 voted for the FDP are not likely to vote for the FDP again.

These were essentially conservative voters who thought the Liberals were too far left.

It will be as difficult a task as those potential FDP voters who really want to leave their old party and join the FDP.

The FDP is not a political hodge-podge as some claimed of the 1980 programme, there are some areas (peace movement, Greens) where the party is trying to be accommodat-

Chancellor can at any time ask the president to dismiss one of his ministers.

Due to a 1976 amendment of the Constitution, the Bundestag, along with the Chancellor, retains full rights until a new Bundestag assumes its function (Article 39). Since a Bundestag must hold its first meeting no more than 30 days after its election, the present parliament will be in office not only after its dissolution by the president but well beyond the elections scheduled for 6 March 1983.

The amendment was adopted with a two-thirds majority in August 1976. It came about in the wake of a dispute dating back to 1972 when Chancellor Willy Brandt lost a confidence vote and parliament was dissolved.

Then, before the amendment, the Bundestag did not continue its work. This was assumed by a "committee to safeguard the rights of the Bundestag".

The parties were unable to agree on whether or not the immunity of the MPs should be upheld after dissolution.

There was also a heated dispute over the question as to whether parliamentary state secretaries should remain in office.

Hans Jörg Soltorf (Handelsblatt, 8 December 1982)

How the government rates

Half the people questioned in an Emnid institute poll are dissatisfied with the Kohl government and 46 per cent gave it their approval.

The institute points out that a similar survey just before the change in Bonn showed that only 26 per cent were satisfied with the Schmidt government and 73 per cent were not.

It says that this time, a major factor in the Kohl government's unpopularity are SPD voters: 85 per cent disapprove of the government despite the short time it has been in office.

Among FDP sympathisers there is a three-quarter majority in favour of the

Polls bad news for the Free Democrats

All this presupposes a campaign aimed at presenting a businesslike image to the left and the right; in other words, a janus-faced middle-of-the-road platform.

The draft election programme that is to be passed at the FDP congress in Freiburg in late January seems to be rather clever on that score.

The economic and social affairs part of the programme, dominated by Count Lambsdorff, draws a clear line between SPD and FDP while the domestic, legal and environmental aspects show some clear differences with the CDU/CSU.

In part the differences are hazy and unclear.

Though the latest programme is not a political hodge-podge as some claimed of the 1980 programme, there are some areas (peace movement, Greens) where the party is trying to be accommodat-

fice. Here, the views of the government parties (SPD and FDP) naturally clashed with those of the opposition for campaign reasons.

After all, the parliamentary state secretaries preferred to keep their heavy official cars complete with pennants.

All these open issues were settled by the amendment. What remains unresolved is the question whether the incumbent parliament must exercise restraint until the new Bundestag meets.

Making use of all the scope available to it, the opposition SPD could, for instance, call for constant "current affairs debates" in the Bundestag or demand that pending legislation be dealt with.

In fact, some opposition MPs have already suggested such a course of action, though the top leadership of the opposition seems to be rather reluctant to go along.

Another facet is that the coalition parties could turn every Bundestag session into a campaign platform while the opposition would be unable to have its chancellorship candidate, Hans-Jochen Vogel, use the parliament as a forum.

For one thing, he is not an MP; for another, even as leader of the opposition in the Berlin parliament he cannot enter into a debate from the Bundestag benches.

The Bundestag Council of Elders is trying to bring about a "moderation agreement" as soon as it becomes definitely known how the Bundestag is to be dissolved.

Hans Jörg Soltorf (Handelsblatt, 8 December 1982)

Kohl-Genscher government; 86 per cent of CDU/CSU voters approve.

The institute says much of the approval is in expectation of what might happen.

Disapproval is strongest among the Greens alternatives (92 per cent).

Simultaneous Emnid polls asked about the most "likeable" political party. Here, 40 per cent voted for the CDU/CSU, 34 per cent for the SPD, 3 per cent for the FDP and 8 per cent for the Greens.

Eleven per cent said they found none likeable. Four per cent gave no opinion.

Heinz Violahn (Welt am Sonntag, 5 December 1982)

ing. And it is here that the programme is not convincing.

Election platforms are no coalition agreements, and the FDP is right in stressing this. It is quite unthinkable that, if there is a new conservative-liberal coalition after elections, the FDP will be able to prevail on all its campaign statements — especially in legal and environmental policy.

The Liberals are bound to clash with the CDU/CSU on such issues as the reform of the anti-terrorism legislation, protection against data abuse (especially in connection with security agencies), aliens legislation and some aspects of environmental legislation.

They are also likely to clash over parts of labour legislation such as continued pay for employees in cases of illness.

Despite efforts to stress specific issues, the campaign will be straightforward and simple — so simple as to ultimately boil down to a plea to the electorate to give the Liberals another chance to move into parliament.

Martin E. Skoldin (Süddeutsche Zeitung, 9 December 1982)

FDP question a tricky one for Chancellor

Nordwest-Zeitung

The CDU will centre its election campaign around the Chancellor, Helmut Kohl. It has deliberately adopted Konrad Adenauer's view that, under the realities of the Constitution, parliamentary elections have become in fact Chancellor elections.

It is natural that in this sort of campaign, there is no room for a partner, in this case the FDP.

But this does not mean that Kohl wants the Free Democrats out of office. He wants them in. But the question is a tactical one: is it wise to keep saying so publicly?

Most of the indications show that Kohl will remain as Chancellor. But alone or in coalition with the FDP?

If it is to be a coalition, the FDP first needs to win the five per cent of the votes necessary to get into the Bundestag. It is doubtful if, in its present condition, the FDP can pull it off.

This could change if the president does in fact dissolve the Bundestag and send the nation to the polls on 6 March. (There is still a constitutional question outstanding which leaves some doubt about whether this mid-term election can be held.)

In their reports to the Bonn party meeting, Helmut Kohl and the party general secretary, Heiner Gelsler, mentioned the FDP only in passing, and more or less indirectly when they spoke of a "middle-of-the-road coalition."

Gelsler even said that only the CDU/CSU provided an alternative to a "Red-Green alliance."

This was a pretty clear statement — in any event clearer than what was said before in interviews and public statements.

Kohl is right in more or less ignoring the FDP. There is no reason why he should publicly concern himself with Germany's Liberals.

Even if he secretly hopes that the Free Democrats will get enough votes to get into the Bundestag, there is no way he can help them to do so.

There have been those in the CDU who suggested "lending" the Free Democrats votes to help them return to the Bundestag. But these ideas have meanwhile been dropped. As one CDU man puts it: "We haven't got a single vote to give away."

In any event, the CDU/CSU have not yet won the election. It is possible that there will be a shift in the strength of the Bundestag camps that could create all sorts of problems.

If the Greens move into parliament instead of the FDP and if no party gets an absolute majority, the CDU/CSU would be faced with its greatest challenge ever.

With this possibility in mind, the conservatives are determined to fight for every vote — and they would be serving more than just party interests. A stable government with a solid majority is a must for this country.

Karl Hugo Pruys (Nordwest-Zeitung, 7 December 1982)

SPD 10.1.83

Bonn opts for protectionism, membership talks, as Council of Ministers themes

Three issues will dominate when Bonn takes over the chair of the EEC Council of Ministers, in the New Year. They are:

- The attempt to curb protectionism within the EEC
- Membership negotiations with Spain and Portugal
- The growing differences of opinion with the French government on trade policy.

This has been outlined by Alois Mertes, Minister of State for European Affairs at the Bonn Foreign Office.

The harmony that was the hallmark of the Copenhagen EEC summit will soon end when it comes to carrying out the resolutions made by the Common Market heads of government.

The European Community faces a tough year both at home and in external relations.

Bonn is to take over the EEC chair in January. Will the Germans be able to give the Common Market a greater boost than the Danes were able to do over the past six months?

The answer is urgently awaited in Brussels and Strasbourg.

Chancellor Kohl may have put great importance on European policy in his government policy statement. He may also have rushed to Brussels for an executive meeting of European Christian Democrats as soon as he was elected.

But signs of unrest have accumulated. Christian Democrats at the European Parliament in Strasbourg are surprised that contacts with Bonn have been so sparing.

At the European Commission in Brussels, officials were surprised that Mertes had failed to put in an appearance.

Social Democratic Euro-MP Horst Seefeld complained that responsibilities seemed not to have been allocated in Bonn.

Some of these problems have since been solved. At a Paris conference of European Christian Democrats Helmut Kohl has sought to demonstrate his commitment to European integration at party-political level.

Herr Mertes has paid his opposite numbers in Paris and London brief visits. He is also due to visit the European Commission in Brussels.

He has ploughed through the paperwork and reached the conclusion that European integration is hard work.

The list of topics brought back by the domestic market delegation to the economic and monetary affairs committee of the European Parliament is disappearing.

It conveys an impression of everyday life in EEC Europe that is bound to put a damper on enthusiasm of any kind.

Mention is made of failure to make headway on settlement of value-added tax on imports, of slow progress on 20 specific technical guidelines, proposals and of stalling on industrial standardisation.

The agenda also includes further powers for the European Commission, tax allowances for travel within the Community and the issue of uniform European Community passports and driving licences.

A specifically German problem is

border checks on individuals, buses and commercial vehicles.

Consolidation of the domestic market is more urgently needed than ever. US Secretary of State Shultz and other heads of department were due to visit Brussels for talks at the time of writing.

Their visit was expected to show whether there was any likelihood of a further transatlantic clash along the lines of the steel war between America and the Common Market.

Farm produce is the latest problem, with the United States fairly accusing the European Community of protectionism.

The trend toward protectionism within the Common Market, especially in the agricultural sector, is one that has long reduced the EEC to a state of paralysis.

It is, moreover, a crucial aspect of the second major issue that lies ahead: the membership negotiations with Spain and Portugal.

Bonn is extremely anxious, for political reasons, to see Spain and Portugal join the EEC. But their accession will cost money, extra cash that is not in the present Common Market kitty.

The two would-be newcomers to the EEC are largely agricultural countries, and their farm output will weigh heavily

on the European Community's agricultural levy system.

The French, Greeks and Italians are anything but keen on this prospect, which is why the French are stalling and would like to see this problem solved before Spain and Portugal join the EEC as full members.

Alois Mertes is reluctant to take sides in the dispute on whether this attitude is in the Common Market's best interest.

France, he says, is keener than other EEC countries on a European identity. In doing so it seeks to reconcile European interests with its own.

Much the same is true of the thorny issue of British net contributions to the Common Market kitty, which Whitehall continues to feel are too high.

All Herr Mertes will say is that the problem is one that threatens to poison the Community.

France and Germany were expected to clash on all these issues at Copenhagen. They didn't.

President Mitterrand made with explaining to Chancellor Kohl the specific French problems that arose from, say, southward enlargement of the EEC.

There is speculation in Paris that France's intransigent Foreign Trade Minister, Michel Jobert, who made life so hard for the Bonn delegation at the Gatt talks in Geneva, may be dropped.

The European Community's agricultural trading policy threatens to impose a serious burden on the EEC's external relations.

The background against which the clash must be seen is that the Common Market has emerged as a major agricultural exporter.

Yet powerful forces in the EEC are keen to deliberately restrict farm imports and to boost exports for all they are worth.

This, viewed internationally, is a most alarming trend.

The European Community prides itself, in development and trade policy, on having made the developing countries numerous trading concessions.

But on closer scrutiny its policy on agricultural produce will be seen to be extremely problematic. In this sector it has merely set about redistribution within the Third World.

The left hand, EEC agricultural policy, has paid little attention to what the right hand, development policy, has been doing.

The Common Market has not cut back its domestic output of the produce for which preferential treatment was given. It has continued to boost home output with a will.

As a result, developing countries that were not granted preferential status have been displaced from EEC markets. Even worse, they have been subjected to fierce competition from EEC exports subsidised to the hilt. This is particularly true of sugar and beef.

The European Community has thus introduced a strong element of discrimination into its economic relations with the Third World.

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The Big Five hold secret meeting to try and stave off major breakdown

The finance ministers and central bank presidents of the five most important industrial nations (USA, Britain, France, Japan and the Federal Republic of Germany) met in Kronberg near Frankfurt this month.

They did not face the press and no communiqué was issued. Why did they hold such a mysterious meeting?

Because several developing and East Bloc countries are no longer able to service their foreign debt on schedule. Their insolvency is not only a financial problem; it could also damage world trade.

A country that is unable to raise a loan cannot import. And since Mexico became a problem virtually overnight, when it found itself unable to repay interest and principal on its foreign debt, the unthinkable has become thinkable: a chain reaction that could lead to a major breakdown.

Politicians have long seen themselves on the edge of an abyss. At the Versailles Summit in June 1982, the governments of the seven major industrial nations tried to find a cure.

But because of many previous unfulfilled promises few people believed that they actually intended to deliver.

At that time, the main industrial nations said that they would strengthen the position of the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

The five nations whose currencies make up the basket on which the Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) — a kind of artificial international currency — are based, are the same that met in Kronberg. The intention was to help the IMF control the economic policies of its member nations, thus making for a bit of collective responsibility in the world's economy.

But what use is it if the five big ones cooperate while the IMF is short of money? Therefore, the Kronberg meeting also dealt with ways and means of speeding up the IMF's supply of funds beyond the usual procedure.

Developments in the Third World are worrying: two oil price explosions created a dangerous international mixture of recession, declining commodity prices, high interest rates and too ambitious development programmes that were put of keeping with long-term financing possibilities.

But commercial banks — acting like lemmings — kept financing these programmes, thus helping to build up mountains of debt. As Bundesbank President Karl Otto Pöhl put it: "At times, the banks were more concerned with expansion than with security and profitability."

Governments, banks, the World Bank and the IMF were brought up short at the last annual meeting of the IMF in Toronto when it turned out that Mexico was far from being the only insolvent country.

Even now, policy makers have been pondering ways and means of preventing the collapse of the world finance system. The key phrase they came up with was "cooperation" by all parties concerned, with the IMF playing a pivotal role.

As an initial measure, the Mexican government was granted bridging facilities by American government authorities and a number of central banks via the Bank for International Settlements in Basle.



Short-term credits helped Mexico weather the rough patch before, concluding a stabilisation agreement with the IMF.

The banks agreed to freeze their claims for the moment and the IMF has meanwhile agreed to grant an emergency credit of close to \$4bn. Brazil applied for \$5bn; and Argentina is in the process of negotiating \$2bn.

Through the Bank for International Settlements, Hungary was granted a bridging loan until the conclusion of negotiations for an IMF credit.

Many of the nations now writing under their foreign debt will soon be queuing up at the IMF credit desk.

The IMF is anxious to help them restore their creditworthiness. But is it equipped to?

The idea behind the IMF is to make life easier for its members. It helps out with short and medium-term loans, repayable after seven years at the latest. The loans depend on current account imbalances that cannot be settled in the short term. The IMF itself receives the funds through its member nations.

These contributions in turn depend on the volume of trade, the GNP and similar data. Member nations can borrow up to one-quarter of their own quota with no strings attached.

As a result, most of the debtors owe it no more than 25 per cent of their own quota.

The more a country goes beyond this 25 per cent, using credit facilities of up to 100 per cent of its quota, the tougher the terms imposed on the borrowing nation.

IMF's ability to impose conditions that will force its debtors to introduce remedial action for previous economic policy mistakes is the basis on which the hope to prevent a collapse of the world's financial system despite mounting debts now rests.



Donald Regan, the American Treasury Secretary (left), with Bonn Finance Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg at the Kronberg finance meeting. (Photo: dpa)

All IMF member nations agree that the Fund's own means of \$67bn are inadequate. But they are far from agreed on the amount by which this liquidity is to be boosted.

Most European Community countries would like to raise the quotas by 50 per cent to total about \$90bn to \$100bn.

The developing countries would like to have this increased to \$120bn. They would also like to see the IMF do away with all strings it now attaches to loans, turning it into a self-service institution.

The USA has so far not been prepared to boost the quotas by more than 40 per cent. Bonn — as usual at international meetings — is proceeding gingerly. It is said that Bonn would like to see the total raised to \$100bn but that it would also go along with \$85bn, wedged as it is between the USA and the EEC.

Generally, the goal is to make America agree to a 50 per cent increase.

The quotas themselves say little about the IMF's actual ability to effectively help countries that suffer from persistent foreign trade and current account imbalances.

Not all currencies are equally suitable for credits. The Indian rupee, for instance, is far less suitable than the US dollar, the deutschemark, the yen and the Swiss franc.

Despite seven quota increases (the eighth was negotiated in Kronberg to the point where it is likely to be finalised by next April) and despite credit agreements with Saudi Arabia and some industrial countries, the Fund's available means are limited — especially compared with demand.

In the first quarter of 1982, the IMF had \$36bn available to it in suitable currencies. This was made up of the contributions of seven industrial, eight oil-exporting and 15 developing countries. In addition, there was the \$21bn available to the IMF in the form of SDRs (which only central banks accept).

As a result it had available to it some \$57bn in suitable currencies.

Of this amount, \$16bn is out on loan, \$15bn has been committed in the form of credits that have not yet been taken up.

The International Monetary Fund

1 The fund has 146 members: industrial countries and 126 developing nations, of whom 12 are exporters.

2 Credits are financed by member payments. It has a total of \$67bn either available or committed. Available funds have been boosted in the past few years by special facilities financed by direct credits granted by national monetary authorities. In addition, there are the special credit agreements with 10 of the most important industrial nations and Switzerland. Under the terms of these agreements, the fund can grant credits of up to \$7bn. It also resorts to money markets.

3 The fund's top executive body is the board of governors. The main decision-making body is the board of directors, and the main policy-making body is the interim committee of members.

making for \$31bn in committed loans one way or another.

The remaining \$26bn would be up very soon if only some of the countries with major foreign debts applied for IMF loans.

The IMF liquidity would also be sufficient if only a few of the more than 70 developing countries that now apply for IMF loans wanted to increase their quotas.

Whether or not the IMF will be able to play a greater role in the financial current account deficits of the developing countries depends on two things.

● Hard currency member would have to provide more, and:

● The debtor nations would have to be prepared to accept unpopular measures regarding their economic policies.

The first of these will be hard to implement because quota increases can be ratified by the individual governments, and this can take years.

So far, only Bonn has taken a positive attitude towards America's proposal to create a special emergency fund that would be re-financed as needed by the ten most important industrial nations plus Switzerland to the tune of \$10bn to \$15bn.

Among the topics of discussion 'Kronberg' was also the question whether the 'special' fund should be made part of the general credit facilities of the ten industrial nations and Switzerland that provide the fund with credits of up to \$7bn under special conditions.

This would mean that the IMF would have another \$17bn to \$22bn available to it. Credits given under the general conditions may, however, only be granted to the participating 11 countries while those from the 'special' fund would be available to all 146 countries outside that group.

only under special conditions. The second prerequisite for strengthening of the IMF's role is easier to meet. After all, once they find themselves in dire straits, governments are more likely to accept the IMF's conditions for loans.

This was not so in the past. In 1981, it lent a net \$50bn to non-producing developing countries, compared with commercial bank loans of \$85bn during the same period.

In the past, the IMF and commercial banks have been competing for the same borrowers.

Continued on page 5

INDUSTRY

Dying steel city looks for a future to forge



Neunkirchen was between 8,000 and 10,000 workers in the steelworks of the city of Neunkirchen. Now all of the industry are two steel plants employing 2,000.

Neunkirchen (pop: 51,000) is the second largest city in the Saar, after Saarbrücken. The whole state is paying the price of depending on two industries, steel and coal.

Neunkirchen is the home town of the German party leader, Erich Honecker, and the East German papers re-echo his plight.

Neunkirchen began to fall in the mid 1960s and 10 years later as prices plummeted and Japan dumped cheap steel on the market.

The next few months will be crucial for Neunkirchen. Its future is largely in the hands of steel company management, unions, the state government and the federal government in Bonn.

Neunkirchen was a saying in Neunkirchen: "Joining the mill means a job."

It is a quote fondly used by those from foreign countries writing about the dying city.

The death began in 1975. The year had been a good year for Neunkirchen. In 1975 a new, non-polluting blast furnace was completed. The traditional brown cloud over the city disappeared and in its place appeared a new white cloud.

Neunkirchen people began to realise that the DM120m plant was a waste of money. They wanted their old smoky cloud back.

Things just kept on getting worse and trouble began in 1977/78: the blast furnace was clean, but there were storm clouds on the horizon.

The family that had led the steel city in prosperity suddenly decided to leave the business.

The Neunkirchen oil company bought the equity, but the work force was not the end was near. A Luxem-

bourg company, Arbed, whose steel production had for years been helping to depress the nearby Neunkirchen works, stepped in and bought the plants at both Neunkirchen and at Röschling-Burbach.

But the world-wide crisis meant that there was no relief. Japan was dumping cheap steel and all the traditional steel-producing nations were paying the price.

The steel magnates of the Saar have been taking their time looking for a way to solve the problem. They began looking in 1977 but have found no solution.

The Saar has been living with uncertainty for five years but there have been nothing more than a few orderly demonstrations and protest rallies.

The main reason for the placid response is that 55-year-olds are able to retire on good pensions. Others hope that subsidies from Bonn will save their jobs.

Still others have been pinning their hopes on working elsewhere: if they could work 30km away at another steel-works at Völklingen, it would mean more travel, but not unemployment.

Some have got jobs there already, but they are still gloomy about the future because it is a more obsolete plant than Neunkirchen's, and is being kept going

only through heavy doses of government money.

Bonn has been pumping millions into the Saar, and the state government knows that it would forfeit its reason for existence if the Arbed-Saar steel-works folded.

Bonn and the Saarland government have already risked and done a great deal, but the Saar man-in-the-street believes that many of the millions pumped in will benefit the Luxembourg steel industry more than the Saar's.

In the mid-1950s when the Saar became German again there were many people who wanted it to become a sort of model state for Europe. They did not want to be German but independent. This was rejected by the majority of voters.

History is full of ironies. The decline of the Saar steel industry has now made the state economically largely dependent on a foreign country after all — Luxembourg.

The next few weeks and months will show the extent of this dependence and whether, as rumour has it, the steel crisis will lead to a disintegration of the Saar.

So what is to be done? Bonn Research Minister Heinz Riesenhuber has been unable so far to commit himself to

Continued from page 5

experience gained in countries that spent a lot of money on such policies, achieving very little (Sweden); and in countries that spent relatively little but imposed heavy restrictions on individuals, forcing them to adapt to worsening economic conditions, managing to keep the jobless rate down (Austria).

The opposing camp, represented among others by the Federal Labour Office, demands that more money be spent. These people fear that there will be a loss of flexibility on the labour market because of declining funds for further training, retraining and other specialised programmes for certain groups of jobless.


There is a kernel of truth in both arguments. Many job creating measures are an open invitation to abuse them and go over board in laying claim to public funds.

Economic Affairs Ministry experts in Bonn are convinced that legislation cannot prevent the abuse of social benefits in one form or another.

They say that the hope that sweeping job creating measures could actually bring about self-sustaining and profitable jobs is unfounded. The state, they say, could save a lot of money without facing charges of having neglected its duty.

On the other hand, many of these drives and programmes are a must. It is, for instance, absolutely necessary to provide training and retraining programmes for the growing mass of jobless who either lack skills or have the wrong ones.

Even if job creating measures might not result in new jobs, they are necessary for social reasons. Handicapped jobless could hardly be placed without them. Moreover, these measures could



shifting Germany's only coal liquefaction plant to Neunkirchen.

The people of Neunkirchen would be happy to accept even such a risky project. But they are also prepared to accept social change and permit the city to become an efficient centre of service industries.

The city council is now looking for new industries. Right now, all that the 51,000 people of Neunkirchen (and the 200,000 others in the vicinity) know is that they want to survive. So does the Saar as a whole.

If the Arbed steel works fold, some 30,000 to 50,000 jobs in the steel industry and related industries would be lost.

Says one politician: "If that happens, we can auction off the Saar to the highest bidder."

Gerd Meiser
(Kleier Nachrichten, 8 December 1982)

also create certain public sector jobs that an unemployed person would have to accept when offered it.

It is obvious that making it compulsory for the jobless to train or retrain and to accept public sector work would reduce the abuse of public funds.


Making it more difficult to abuse benefits and paring down some of these benefits could ease the financial position of the Labour Office. But it would not really remedy our unemployment woes.

It is up to the government's economic and fiscal policy and to the parties to collective bargaining (who still do not understand the link between unemployment and wages) to create new jobs.

For the time being, job creating policies are growing ever more expensive — and this won't change after the 6 March national elections.

Dieter Piel
(Die Zeit, 3 December 1982)

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PERSPECTIVE

Signs that peace movement is beginning to lose its sense of direction

The German peace movement appears to have lost some of its direction: it has grown too complicated. It may not be split, but it is sometimes confusingly organised.

The number of member groups has grown too large to count, and even the respective leader no longer all maintain contact with one another.

People get confused when events organised by different parts of the movement clash. The clashes are not always unintentional.

It is now three years since the Brussels Nato summit decided on its missile modernisation programme for Europe, the event that gave the peace movement its major push.

In a year the need to go ahead with modernisation will be looked at again in the light of how much progress has been made at the Geneva missile talks.

But the leaders of the peace movement do not give the impression of having any idea how to influence the missile-and-talks issue.

It seems that they do not know how they will prevent or delay modernisation if the go-ahead is given.

And they have no idea how they might believably claim some credit if any progress is made at Geneva.

Moves agreed by the peace movement lately, at two conferences in Frankfurt, for instance, are unlikely to be of any lasting effect.

Petitions against missile modernisation have been launched (and in some cases are still in circulation) by the Krefeld Appeal group, by the trade unions and by groups in Bielefeld, Starnberg, Datteln and so on.

At a rough estimate they have been signed by about 10 per cent of the adult population of the Federal Republic of Germany.

Continued from page 4

den on strained political ties between Europe and America.

The European Commission has suggested gradually harmonising EEC and US grain prices. That would be most convenient for the United States.

Might America not be prepared in return to agree to self-restraint in exports of grain substitutes provided Europe kept to a grain price timetable?

The Americans feel a unilateral measure of self-restraint in maize gluten exports is out of the question.

EEC policymakers feel US grain prices would be virtually inconceivable in Europe without compensation of some kind.

Viewed singly, neither idea stands much chance of political approval. In combination they might well be feasible.

Agricultural trading policy on both sides of the Atlantic would then be pursued not against each other but in harmony.

Common Agricultural Policy, once the motive force of European integration, has come to be a burden on domestic relations in the European Community.

We must not allow it to wreak havoc on external relations too.

Stefan Tangermann,
(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung
für Deutschland, 7 December 1982)

These four million signatures or so have been fairly ineffective because representative democracy does not need to pay any attention to what is claimed to be basis democracy.

Individual petitions are not bound to be successful merely by virtue of having been submitted to parliament or the government.

This point has been made to the supporters of the trade union appeal. It will be clear to the Krefeld group, led by Petra Kelly and Josef Weber; they have no intention of even submitting their lists of signatures to the Bonn Chancellor.

Yet further appeals to sign the Krefeld Appeal were endorsed by the German Peace Society, affiliated to War Resisters International, and by the Committee for Peace, Disarmament and Cooperation.

They were made at the Frankfurt annual conference of the former, the DFG/VK, and a Frankfurt working session of the latter, the Kofaz.

Dr Helmut Simon, a Karlsruhe Constitutional Court judge, had a suggestion to make at a conference to prepare for the Protestant Church assembly.

Given this pointless competition for signatures he wondered whether a "consultative referendum" might not be held as a kind of plebiscite to put much-vaunted public opinion to parliament or the government.

It would not, as he envisaged it, be in any way binding on the government.

Constitutionally, the referendum idea is extremely dubious. It would be an expensive exercise. The value of the outcome would be doubtful too.

The only question that could be put would be whether the public was for or against stationing new medium-range missiles in Germany.

The peace movement would be most embarrassed if a majority were to insist on missile modernisation even though the government no longer felt it was necessary.

Any question that might arise in connection with the democratic legitimisation of a decision by the government, which is responsible to parliament, to go ahead with missile modernisation has already been answered in constitutional terms.

Chancellor Kohl's intention is to hold an early general election to gain a

clear electoral mandate in favour of the Nato resolution.

One reason why he plans to go to the people is to decide whether there is to be a Bundestag majority in favour of the resolution without ifs and buts or a majority that takes a more ambivalent approach.

The early general election, unlike the next regular deadline in autumn 1984, would be held well in advance of the decision to go ahead with missile modernisation, should it need to be taken.

A general election in March 1983 would not, unlike a deadline in autumn 1982, be overburdened by urgently needed economic policy decisions.

In opting for an early poll, Helmut Kohl has taken much of the wind out of the sails of the peace movement.

Kofaz was first to adapt to the new situation. It called on the movement to use the election campaign to mobilise opinion against a further arms build-up.

Preventing the stationing of Pershing 2 and Cruise missiles in Germany, it said, was a matter of survival, jobs and social rights.

The DFG/VK decided to lay down guidelines by which the election manifestos of political parties were to be judged.

So nothing will come of appeals by Social Democratic foreign policy specialist Karsten D. Voigt not to wage an election campaign on the missiles issue.

The peace movement, like Chancellor Kohl, seems determined to get voters to commit themselves on the subject.

All leading organisations in the movement, including Kofaz, the DFG/VK, the Aktion Sühnezeichen, the national coordinating bodies of protest movements and political parties such as the Greens, plan to back the campaign to get local authorities to declare their areas nuclear-free zones.

Maybe they have chosen to because they lack confidence in their ability to win the day. Maybe it is because they feel most at home and most confident of success at local level.

Nuclear-free zone campaigns, which are often backed by the local SPD, are unperturbed by the point made by the Interior Ministers of North Rhine-Westphalia and Hesse.

The Ministers have pointed out that

Emergency finance meeting

Continued from page 6

banks operated in different markets. The IMF borrowers were countries whose access to international money markets was barred because they had wrecked their credit rating. They therefore had no choice but to put up with the IMF's tough terms.

The banks made their credit deals in countries that were not yet at the point where they had to accept the IMF's rescue programmes.

The IMF will continue to play a quantitatively limited and qualitatively important role in the field of international finance.

Even if the IMF's liquidity is boosted (which would also boost international liquidity and hence inflation), the quali-

ty of its credit would still remain more important than the quantity.

IMF's stringent economic guarantees that its debtors will tighten their economies.

IMF invariably insists that anti-inflationary measures be introduced and this, in turn, improves the borrower's ability to repay the debt.

As a result, it would make sense if commercial banks and the IMF cooperated closely. A country that has accepted the IMF's rescue programme for its economy would also have something akin to a seal of approval with which to obtain additional credit from commercial banks. Without this, the lender's money would go into a bottomless pit.

Rudolf Herk
(Die Zeit, 10 December 1982)

local authorities have no authority to declare themselves nuclear-free zones. But the campaigns are going ahead regardless because their organisers say they will reach the public and gain support.

They are a means of approaching people one knows personally, people who are well-disposed toward the campaign.

This seemed to be the idea behind "peace weeks" held in November last year, or so it seemed, by church organisations in their local parishes.

A spokesman for the German Protestant Church has claimed that about the country's parishes, or between 5 and 6,000, held peace week meetings.

Aktion Sühnezeichen, a church organisation, plans to evaluate the outcome in the months ahead. It seems sure to conclude that the peace movement is a generally poor state.

Confusion is the word for ideas "direct non-violent action" called alongside other kinds of boycott, at DFG/VK annual conference.

The term is generally used to describe activities that verge on duress brought to bear on organs of state.

A wide range of such plans was discussed at the Frankfurt gathering "autonomous" peace groups.

The two-week "blockade" of the clear weapons depot at Grossengraben last summer is considered a success even though its success is disputed.

Activities are planned in the weeks ahead at Nördlich air base, near Cologne, at a nuclear weapons depot near Hamburg, near the US Rhine-Main base, Frankfurt, and at Grossengraben again.

Protest groups will tour bunker subway stations that are claimed to be suitable as fallout shelters.

Such moves amount to more than discussions and street theatre, as the organisers readily admit.

"For people who have hitherto no more than take part in demonstrations and publicity work," it was pointed out in one paper, "taking part in disobedience campaigns near nuclear facilities is undeniably a move."

Reports by those who have taken part in such activities show that such activities are not, although the authorities have been changed from time to time to be to blame.

"We are far from free of anxiety," a paper continued, "when we bear in mind that such activities represent a modest encroachment on the constitutional availability of and access to nuclear weapons demanded by Nato military men."

"The brasshats are thus challenged to respond directly."

Over the past two years there have been meetings in Bonn, Easter marches, music festivals, peace weeks and countless events sponsored by hundreds of thousands of supporters of the peace movement.

Since all this activity has failed to accomplish anything whatever there is a hollow ring to the following claim: "Extra-parliamentary resistance emerges as the only, the crucial means of bringing about a situation in the Federal Republic of Germany in 1983 in which the stationing of medium-range missiles is made politically impossible."

A more realistic claim was made by a member of the movement from Westphalia who said that local leaders of the peace movement behaved like an elite.

"Everyone does what he wants," Georg Heide
(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland, 4 December 1982)

TRANSPORT

New Mercedes aimed at smaller-car market

For years, people wanting to buy Mercedes have had to go on a wait-

list. Daimler-Benz have been able to produce while other motor manufacturers considered themselves sales kept steady.

It seems hardly any need for Daimler-Benz to introduce its new model. Their range of cars without a model is clearly ideal.

Stuttgart manufacturers went with plans for a new model, the 190, for the middle market.

Decided to go ahead after the oil crisis at the end of 1973," says Daimler-Benz board chairman Gerhard

Mercedes with lower fuel consumption to meet demand after a heavy increase in petrol

Daimler-Benz were not, he says, immediately imminent consumer regulations in the United States.

Mercedes sold in North America diesel models, to US regulations did not have affected Daimler-Benz one way or the other.

Developments in the United States and the direction the trend "he admits.

Prices have since grown even more, but not as much as had been feared, and fuel consumption has not perceptibly in the existing range.

At the decision to go ahead with the 190, Herr Prinz is convinced it was a premature move when viewed in retrospect.

Mercedes is generally rated higher than other manufacturers, regardless of the time at any given time. This ecological consciousness is not going to be so we have to bear it in mind.

For the W201, as the 190 has been known at Daimler-Benz since 1976, the range has been changed from time to time to be to blame.

Originally planned to manufacture about 60,000 Mercedes cars a year, the chief executive says, "we aim to sell to a new customer."

Year 100,000 Mercedes 190s are expected from the Stuttgart assembly lines. Output is eventually to total

new customers are to be motivated in the past have not wanted a car not because it was too expensive because it was too big for

Prinz studiously avoids any suggestion of this possibility, however. He merely shows "what potential" the new model has.

Obviously agree. They unveiled the new models a few days before the 190 was premiered and plan to manufacture 1,200 a day, as against the previous models.

Mercedes are not just going to win the new model how owners of larger Mercedes will

now be considering whether the smaller model might not serve them equally well.

Herr Prinz is not prepared to forecast the extent to which this might be the case. All he will say is that Daimler-Benz are prepared to be extremely flexible in the output of their various models.

In the medium term he is confident that overall sales of Mercedes will increase, by virtue of the new 190, from 450,000 to 550,000 a year.

The 190 is also designed to promote the Mercedes image. It will demonstrate that Mercedes are not just de luxe models, expensive and behind the times.

Even at a time when the price of petrol is steadily increasing the Mercedes, it is hoped the new model will show, still makes sense.

Technically, the new model is fairly conventional. The engine is in front, the transmission at the rear.

Der Spiegel, the Hamburg news weekly, promptly claimed the 190's chassis was the shape of things to come.

Herr Prinz is not quite so enthusiastic. He feels the 190 is a classical Mercedes which strikes a balance between utility and comfort.

Its aerodynamic rating has been improved to 0.33, falling just short of the 0.3 of the new Audi 100. Herr Prinz says aerodynamics cannot be the sole consideration.

Further streamlining is technically possible but would require intolerable compromises in other departments, he says.

But he is proud of the weight that has been shed. The 190 weighs 1,080kg, or 280kg less than the next model in the Mercedes range.

"That," he says, "is a gigantic step forward for us." The smallest 190 weighs the same as the BM2 323i, the target model in the comparable BMW range.

But the BMW 323i has a six-cylinder engine. BMW say it is pure coincidence that their range has been restyled at almost the same time as the Mercedes 190 was unveiled.

"We planned to launch our new models a year later," says BMW's Karlheinz Radermacher, "but stepped up development work to keep pace with US consumer regulations."

The new US regulations have been shelved by the Reagan administration, but the BMW board in Munich decided to launch the new range regardless.

Richard Gaul
(Die Zeit, 10 December 1982)



Is it really needed? Daimler-Benz' new Mercedes, the 190.
(Photo: Mercedes-Benz)

Hovertrain trials enter the crucial last phase

The Bonn Research Ministry has invested more than DM700m in various hovertrain projects since development began in 1968. But doubts are widespread that a commercially run hovertrain will ever run in the Federal Republic of Germany. Much will depend on tests due to start in February on a stretch of track being built between the villages of Lathen and Dörpen in the Emsland region, near the Dutch border.

Trials over the new 20-mile stretch of track marks the end of the programme to test various high-speed hovertrain designs.

The Bonn Research Ministry decided in 1978 in favour of the electromagnetic principle in its quest for a high-speed mass transport system for passengers and high-grade freight.

The hovercraft principle has been dropped. So has the electrodynamic principle. The electromagnetic principle was patented in Germany in 1937.

The power of attraction between electromagnets in the railcar and along the track is computer-set to ensure that the two stay a steady centimetre apart.

The train thus appears to hover on this once-centimetre chink between it and the track.

The railcar supports perch on top of the monorail track. They surround it virtually on all sides, and when the magnets are switched off the car's runners settle on the track.

Power is provided by a linear electric motor that also functions as a brake. The hovertrain can reach top speeds of up to 250mph over long distances.

The system that is first to be put through its paces on the new track will be the Transrapid, designed and built by a consortium headed by Messerschmitt-Bölkow-Blohm (MBB).

Preliminary trials will be completed by next October. Further tests will be

run by a company whose shareholders include the Bundesbahn and Luft Hansa. Bends and inclines are being built into the track to simulate practical running conditions.

The hovertrain is envisaged as an intercity link or airport access system over distances of up to 60 miles and at speeds of up to 200mph.

It may also be used as an international link between European conurbations, over longer distances and at speeds of up to 250mph.

The experimental track will be 31.5km (about 20 miles). Its first stage is 20.6km (about 13 miles). It runs on prefabricated concrete pylons at intervals of between 20 and 37 metres.

It will comprise a high-speed section and a bend with a radius of 1,690 metres, plus (in the final stage) a narrower loop.

The experimental hovertrain consists of two sections. It is 54 metres long, 3.7 metres wide, 3.9 metres tall and weighs 122 tonnes.

It will run experimentally for a maximum 18 hours a day, regardless of temperature, wind, rain or snow.

Test data will be computer-evaluated and take into account functioning, safety, reliability, noise, maintenance, servicing and passenger comfort.

The train must accelerate smoothly. The new system of points must be thoroughly tested to ensure there are no sudden jerks.

Points will not cross in the conventional manner; they will bend. It is a complicated system that needs extensive trials.

The first stage of the experimental track is expected to cost DM422m. By the end of this month orders totalling DM25m will have been placed with local firms.

This is extremely important in a depressed area near the Dutch border. The hovertrain project will also, MBB say, emphasise Germany's lead in this mode of transport.


Other countries are also active. Britain, France, Canada, Russia, America and, especially, Japan are working hard on rival projects.

All over the world theoretical and experimental research and practical trials are in progress.

The shape the hovertrain may take will depend on the results of the trials and on the cost of the project.

But none the countries that are working on hovertrain projects want to fall behind and allow others to reap the benefits.

Gerhard Taube
(Deutsches Allgemeines Sonntagsblatt, 28 November 1982)



Does it have a commercial future? MBB's Hovertrain going through its paces.
(Photo: Krauss-Maffei)

THE ENVIRONMENT

Coordinating body tries to resolve differences of protest groups

The BBU, or national coordinating body of environmental protest groups, was launched 10 years ago.

It celebrated the anniversary in such a level-headed, businesslike manner that it seemed happy its teething troubles were over.

The general assembly was held in a canary-yellow comprehensive school in Hanover, a factory-like building that did not lend itself to demonstrations of pride in what had been achieved.

A degree of satisfaction was the most that could be said to have been voiced by the 100 or so delegates.

They were satisfied that the organisation had succeeded in keeping together and emerging as a factor in environmental policy that parliaments and the authorities could no longer ignore.

The BBU office has moved from Karlsruhe to Bonn (and the organisation does not amount to much more than an office). The move testifies to self-confidence.

It is a self-confidence BBU officials have long felt but one that is not shared by many protest groups affiliated to it.

They still sense the contradiction between a spontaneous, local and one-off protest group and a central organisation, no matter how loosely organised it might be.

They are worried that people at the



top might lose contact with the grass roots, the rank and file.

But after 10 years of work there is a growing realisation that both local activities and countrywide campaigns are needed.

As one delegate put it, it was high time the organisation abandoned short trousers and donned its first suit and the change brooked no further delay.

The BBU was keen to establish a wide-ranging alliance of all extra-parliamentary forces. It had long abandoned the narrowly-based platform of an anti-nuclear power movement.

In its progress toward what Jo Leinen, spokesman for the executive committee, called an ecological and alternative movement the BBU increasingly reflected the public debate.

The debate on the future of industrial society had only just begun in earnest.

All constituent groups will not choose to follow the BBU in this direction, but there have always been groups that resigned membership and others that took their place.

The BBU has never led from above; it has never been more than a letter-box

or central information service for individual groups, and the groups have taken care to ensure that was how it remained.

That is why there is little point in wondering how many members the BBU unites. It has access to about 1,050 groups with a combined membership of roughly 300,000, but it cannot mobilise them.

What individual groups do is entirely for them to decide, and they are keen to retain their independence.

By no means all environmental groups are affiliated to the BBU. More are affiliated to it in the south, less in the north of the country.

The protest groups are legitimate political offspring of the Social and Free Democratic coalition in keeping with Willy Brandt's promise to "risk more democracy."

But they have chosen to aim at a somewhat different, more grass-root democratic interpretation by which greater importance is attached to group independence than to the weight carried by a large organisation.

Where a specific objective is at stake, such as an autobahn, a chemicals factory or a kindergarten that is needed, this independent status makes sense.

But major, supranational issues, from atmospheric pollution to waste of ground water, call for organised activity at state or national level.

This need runs counter to the origins of the protest group movement, which began as a spontaneous reaction by individuals personally affected.

The anniversary conference dealt, against this background, with three issues: topics, the crisis in connection with forms of activity and the question: "What has been accomplished?"

There can be no doubt that classical environmental issues will continue to be dealt with, but they alone are no longer enough.

Experts needed

"Acid rainfall is an environmental hazard that actually exists, but what about genetic engineering, the potential hazards of which can but be imagined (albeit without much difficulty)?"

The protest movement can no longer manage without expert opinion and specialists; and the gap between those who are conversant with the facts and those who carry out the groups' activities grows ever wider.

Has the demonstration as the major form of activity outlived its usefulness? A majority felt it had not, but was aware of the problems that arose from the participation of "autonomous groups."

These are groups that are prepared to use violence, whereas the BBU strictly insists on non-violence. When and where is the line to be drawn?

Do new forms of non-violent action exist that might have a wider public appeal?

About 1,800 demonstrators against the new runway at Frankfurt airport look like facing criminal proceedings that could easily lead to suit for damages or payment of the cost of sending in the police.

Ought the BBU to keep its view of itself on this risk of the right to demonstrate being undermined by government cash demands? Or should it see this as a civil rights movement?

"In 10 years we have made progress," said Inge Ammon, who was elected to the executive committee.

"But in future," she added, "we must not just accuse; we must outline realistic solutions."

True enough, environmental awareness has been heightened. So, too, has the uneasy consciousness of ecological offenders.

But the BBU has failed to achieve a breakthrough to a generally accepted ecological viewpoint.

It has no desire to have dealings with the political parties, preferring to steer clear of them. This even applies to the Greens, although a benevolent view of them is taken.

Many Greens come from the ranks of protest groups and even from the BBU itself, but the BBU would prefer to remain identified with the Greens.

The Greens, after all, are felt to have accomplished everything they were the characteristic features of the BBU members are also the features of the Greens.

This they owe to their status as a violent, non-partisan, extra-parliamentary movement.

This definition betrays uncertainty and the change of power in Bonn has only a minor part.

Nearly everyone in the movement says a colder wind is now blowing. Some are firmly convinced the Greens are then an outsider, in Paris from 1914. He appreciated his disorientation to impose legal restraint on the BBU.

In point of fact, however, the protest groups are suffering from the consequences of their own success.

The BBU has grown so large and so influential, indeed popular, that it is now a formidable force in the political arena.

It feels duty bound to be even more successful and not to disappoint its members.

But no-one yet knows how to do this without becoming a lobby or a political auxiliary and without losing the character of the movement.

The BBU is so at a loss as to what to do from here that it no longer is proud of what it has accomplished.

Several million ordinary people engaged in practical politics as members of protest groups.

Many preferred as a result not to be involved in politics, but as established political parties but more, especially young people, are looking for an alternative to resignation and indifference.

In criticising shortcomings of the system they have stabilised the system point they are not so happy to hear of the influence on the parties.

remained disappointingly slight, and why some BBU members are looking for the idea of functioning as a Bonn environmental lobby.

All this is to be discussed next year at a strategy conference. The BBU has long progressed from environmental conservation to ecology and politics.

It deals with missile modernisation, the peace movement, upholding and defending democratic rights, solidarity with the victims of Bonn spending, be they students or tenants, and structures in the economy and society.

Outsiders are less in doubt about the success of the BBU in coming to terms with the change.

Horst Bleck (Die Zeit, 3 December 1982)

THE ARTS

De Chirico: a longing for unknown horizons



Albert Einstein's pithy, aphoristic description of the painter Giorgio de Chirico, 1888-1978, remains unbeaten but forgotten:

He lives between Florence and the political parties, preferring to steer clear of them. This even applies to the Greens, although a benevolent view of them is taken.

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Horst Bleck (Die Zeit, 3 December 1982)

But it is a half-hearted attempt that carries little conceptual conviction, and for some inexplicable reason 1935 is taken as a turning point.

The full rooms hung with his metaphysical paintings are followed by an eclectic and scaled-down appendix that can hardly be said to succeed in even posing the crucial question.

Historically, the crucial question is that of the relationship between continuity and de Chirico's break with his past.

The Nietzsche quotations listed in the catalogue and the abundance of facts and individually illuminating iconographical analyses are not much help either.

They run a risk of making de Chirico's paintings appear nothing but riddles, unless, that is, one is prepared to accept an interpretation that is a hopeless mess even in historical terms.

In this connection light is shed solely by Christian Derouet's brilliant and well-founded work on de Chirico's neo-baroque gladiator series.

This is even though it evidently runs counter to other writers by implicitly confirming Rubin's view, and Rubin's spirited plea for prime importance to be attached to de Chirico's early work is determinedly and convincingly seen in the context of modernity.

Yet the gruesome series of portraits at the Munich exhibition shows that de Chirico, while styling himself with increasing insistence and virtuoso painting a tragic seer and thinker and a monumental figure, retained a vivid capacity at least as a painter of pathetic gestures.

His love of riddles, here conjured in inscriptions, all too often ends in empty rhetoric. Where de Chirico earlier allowed what Breton called the *objet-fantôme* to speak, the riddle remains solely in capital letters. In his metaphysical painting the ambivalence of petrification and life, expressing a conflict situation specific to the era, shows how the painter's ego has grown alien to him, along with the world. It features wide and empty squares lined by arcades in deep shadow and by walls that time and again hide what is behind them from view. On them monuments and tiny schematic human, toy-like train shapes and clocks convey the effect of hermetic ciphers from an inner world projected outwardly. Like his tailor's dummies, manikins and, as it were, physiognomically throttled masks, they are images of a

mainly objectified world. The emotional overvaluation of distorted objects that appear condensed and split up at one and the same time, as in a dream, is the result of a melancholy view. De Chirico, in his own words, was possessed by a longing for unknown horizons.

The melancholy disposition has long included a love of geometry, and this love is ever-present in de Chirico's paintings.

It is literally embodied in his metaphysical interiors with their unstably interspersed angles.

What with irritatingly interspersed stalks of sugar candy, plaited confectionery and geographical maps, they convert the studio picture of old into a mysterious still life.

Where pictures of disused factories are included, quotation-like, the anachronistic role of art in an industrial society is also described.

Where the gods are dead, art becomes the refuge of metaphysics.

De Chirico's imagination is fired by the seemingly emblematic symbols of advertising, unexpectedly ranked alongside antique busts of Apollo to mark a break between the ancient world and the present.

As objects stand still, historic discontinuity seems to part company with time altogether.

De Chirico's longing is for the lost world of ancient art and mythology. It keeps alive a painful recollection of childhood.

One is reminded of Freud's psychoanalytical interpretations of ancient myths and Aby Warburg's interpretation of antiquity.

The broken topicalisation of antiquity, reminiscent of Arnold Böcklin and Max Klinger, stands in tension with the everyday world of objects.

At the time, de Chirico withstood the tension, reestablishing a backward-looking romantic empathy with the past.

De Chirico ends by drawing a conclusion from a conflict that came to a head in the 19th century, being strikingly put by Karl Marx, who asked:



De Chirico: self portrait, 1919.

(Photos: Catalogue)

"Where is Vulcan in comparison with Robert & Co., Jupiter in comparison with the lightning conductor and Hermes in comparison with the Crédit mobilier?"

"Is Achilles possible alongside powder and lead? Would the Iliad be conceivable alongside the printing press and printing machinery?"

"Do singing, sagas and the muse not necessarily end with the age of print, with the end of essential prerequisites of epic poetry?"

From this anachronistic relationship noted by Marx, de Chirico develops his new poetry, although he would have been unlikely to arrive at a style of his own had it not been for his encounter with the Paris avant-garde.

His Chinese puzzle with perspective recreating the spatial illusion of the Renaissance, only to dash it by abruptly combining several vanishing points, would have been inconceivable without the schooling provided by Cubism.

So, as Soby and Rubin have shown, would his decision to dispense with uniform lighting and corresponding body modelling.

But where the Cubists aimed at a reflection on modes of portrayal and sought to demonstrate the difference between fact and fiction of painting, what de Chirico aims at is a mode of expression.

The staggering irrationality of his rooms, vanishing into the background and then suddenly turning, serves to make matters mysterious and seem bereft of location and gravity.

De Chirico's pictorial world lacks stability. Scenes are broken and shadows live lives of their own, like Peter Schlemmer's in Chamisso's Romantic novella.

Even colours are seen in identical contrast near and far, starkly contrasting directions of movement block each other as in a trauma.

De Chirico turns into a motif of paralysis, what the futurists were to see as the quintessence of a new aesthetics, the celebration of speed and technology.


His locomotives and ships may gather steam but they are also rigidly immobile. In this perspectivalisation of anxiety de Chirico reflects the shadow of the First World War.

Monika Stenhausen
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung
für Deutschland, 4. Dezember 1982

De Chirico's catalogue is available from
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SOCIETY

Persistent alcoholism given as reason for not legalising soft drugs

Drugs such as cannabis and LSD are not quite as popular as they were in the 1970s, a Munich conference has been told.

But socially acceptable additions, such as alcohol caused as many problems as ever. There was, therefore, no case for easing restrictions on soft drugs.

Christiane F., now a budding pop singer, is no longer the 15-year-old cover girl most Germans associated with heroin addiction a few years ago.

Her tale, that of a West Berlin addict in her early teens who, unlike many of her friends, kicked the habit, was serialised in *Stern* magazine.

It sold well as a book and the film version of *Wir Kinder vom Bahnhof Zoo* (We Children of Zoo Station) was also seen by many.

Christiane F.'s name was a household word that has now almost been forgotten. It is just as well: it will never be known how many young people her tale must have encouraged to follow in her junkie footsteps.

It would be best if magazines which claim to feature such stories for educational purposes were to steer clear of, say, the glue-sniffers of Berlin or Cologne.

They would again be to blame for popularising drug addiction to epidemic proportions.

Drugs are an unsolved problem that cannot simply be reduced to spectacular instances of institutional failure such as lay behind the dead Frankfurt fixer whose tale was recently told on an TV current affairs programme.

The problem cannot be limited to drugs generally accepted as narcotics in society today, to hallucinogens such as LSD, cannabis, cocaine and the opiates. Branding them as illegal merely made it easier to take others less seriously, lawyer Arthur Kreuzer told the 34th annual conference of the German Social Paediatric Association in Munich.

Alcohol was one such alternative that needed to be taken seriously, both because its use was so widespread and because of the effect it had on individuals and society.

Criminal activity in connection with alcohol was, he estimated, more widespread than crime in connection with narcotics.

Educationally the distinction in law between cannabis and alcohol made no sense, but that was not to be taken as a plea for easing restrictions on "soft" drugs.

"We already have a whole range of difficulties with alcohol to deal with," said pharmacologist Wolfgang Forth. There was no need of yet another narcotic to be socially integrated.

Instead of debating whether cannabis ought to be made more freely available we ought to be wondering whether we have nothing better to offer young people than the freedom to indulge in unreal dreams in a state of intoxication. The drug scene has eased off a little, international statistics show. This impression was borne out by a number of papers at the Munich interdisciplinary conference.

Hashish consumption has declined in comparison with the 1970s in Germany, which cannot be said of heroin or co-



caine, the fashionable drug preferred by the creative upper class.

A trend has been apparent for the past three years in the United States too. There has been a slight decline in hashish and opiate consumption.

Heroin consumption has likewise declined slightly lately in the US. There also has been a substantial drop in the market for LSD and angel's dust.

And there is a change in the reasons given for drug consumption. US youngsters used to share a joint to get high; now they claim to take drugs to boost performance.

There is a corresponding increase in the taking of tablets and pills, a habit particularly widespread among women.

The trend is borne out by 1973, 1976 and 1980 polls of Bavarian youngsters aged 12 to 24.

The Bavarian polls take into account the No. 1 drug, alcohol. An estimated 8.7 per cent of Bavarian youngsters are potential or actual alcoholics.

In the 1980 poll 11 per cent of the young people questioned said they had taken drugs; in the previous poll their number was 12 per cent.

In all three polls two out of three takers merely tried narcotics out. In this category, numbers have declined, whereas regular users have remained steady at between four and five per cent.

There has been a steady decline in both categories among 12- to 17-year-olds. Among 17- to 24-year-olds the number of consumers in either category has stayed at a steady 18 per cent.

Young people are definitely older than they used to be when they smoke their first joint. In 1980 they were 17 on average; in 1976 they were 15.

Among regular users the trend is even more marked. In 1976 46 per cent of addicts were 18-20 years old and 27 per cent 21-24.

In 1980 41 per cent were 21-24 years old and 33 per cent 18-20.

The drug most frequently taken is hashish, which in the Bavarian polls is listed alongside LSD, mescaline and other hallucinogens.

Its popularity increased from two thirds in 1973 to nearly three quarters in 1980, compared with a decline in the

popularity of LSD, mescaline and other hallucinogens.

But the same proportion of the population drink alcohol every day or almost every day (55 per cent of men and 20 per cent of women) as in 1973 and 1978.

A curious finding: the highest proportion of regular drinkers is in villages of fewer than 2,000 people. Yet the addiction rate is highest in cities and reduces with the size of the community.

Since 1978, however, the number of potential alcoholics has declined. New 14 per cent of men and five per cent of women are felt to be potential alcoholics.

The highest proportion of regular consumption frequency of other narcotics. The figures for these were five per cent for opiates, mainly heroin, in 1980, 11 per cent for stimulants, four per cent for sniffing and an unspecified but definite decline in consumption of LSD and mescaline.

Cocaine abuse is on the increase, from two per cent in 1973 to four per cent in 1980, while in terms of drug consumers as a whole the comparison is even more striking.

Cocaine was taken by seven per cent of youngsters who had tried out narcotics in 1980 and by 13 per cent of regular users, the figures for 1973 being three and seven per cent.

Hashish undeniably continues to be the drug most people first try, although only five per cent of people who have ever given it a try end up as heroin addicts.

Yet most of the estimated 30,000 to 70,000 heroin addicts in the Federal Republic of Germany began their narcotics careers with hashish, said Cologne sociologist Karl-Heinz Reuband.

So there is not an automatic progression from the joint to the fix, especially as cannabis is not habit-forming in the sense of creating a physical addiction.

That is more than can be said for barbiturates, painkillers, heroin and alcohol, and even among heroin addicts there are cases or people voluntarily kicking the habit, as Arthur Kreuzer pointed out.

He felt pacemaker theories of all kinds were naive. By no means all juvenile shoplifters went on to become fully-fledged criminals.

Many young people who give drugs a try give them up because they get nothing from them. Such expectations and disappointments were as much part of a drug career as social background, Herr Reuband said.

Progress or access to drugs could only be understood in the context of young people's social contacts.

Those who were sociable and had friends stood a greater chance of coming into contact with drugs. But it would be wrong simply to refer to young people being led astray.

Progress was determined by curiosity typical of the young; by the desire to gain personal experience even though the risk (of, say, heroin) was well known.

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ties with what was a peer group were introduced to narcotics by friends. This was the usual way in which access to drugs was gained; it deterred the further progress of young people toward addiction.

Drug taking is behaviour that must be learnt. To this day it remains, as hygiene expert M. Franke put it, the expression of social protest.

It might, Herr Kreuzer said, be a cursor of psychosocial deviation, was not problems, subjectively, that paved the way into the drug world, Herr Reuband added.

What made it so attractive was the experience of the scene. As Herr Kreuzer put it: "The dealer is felt to be a friend, not a murderer."

Young people may be less inclined to attribute drug taking to personal demons, but these problems object exist.

Drugs were taken, H. Solms said, to give satisfaction but to avoid dissatisfaction.

Outlining a psychoanalytical approach through the trial of a man tempted at self-treatment, albeit one doomed to failure, on the part of the immature personality.

The clash between a weak ego with the libido, and a tyrannical superego was externalised and transformed into certain aspects of society that were tacked as being authoritarian.

This was inwardly depleted, and demands of the superego were projected on to the "others," thereby giving rise to a physical addiction.

The addict fought on two fronts: against himself and against the world. He constantly wavered between rebellion and clinging on to others.

Therapeutic treatment of addicts must bear this in mind. An addict will seek via drugs the emotional kindness he felt unable to find himself for fear of being overwhelmed by his own emotions.

Treatment must attempt to make the positive experience of the drug use superfluous by virtue of positive emotional experience in the therapy group.

It must entail progress toward reality for young people with psychic distress resulting from a disturbed childhood interface.

Parents must thus in evitably be involved in the therapy, and this was for more than one speaker at the conference.

But nothing was said by parents of drug addicts, and no reports were given by therapists on practical experience in the therapy group.

Therapeutic treatment of addicts no longer felt as it was a few years ago, said a psychologist.

Psychologist Elisabeth Franke said that 19 of 30 young addicts who had fallen foul of the law and been sent to Parsberg, a closed hospital for juveniles, had now broken with the habit.

D. Ladewig outlined findings of an aftercare in Basle, Switzerland. Half the addicts reviewed had broken off their habit, but 80 per cent of those who lasted the distance, 18 months in a rehabilitation community, either kicked drug habit or managed to run their lives.

It was, he said, a four-stage process consisting of decontamination, breaking the habit, rehabilitation and aftercare. The crucial feature was to give addicts a sense of self-assurance. Genuine sense must be shown in the individual.

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STATE SECURITY

Tank armour secret to all but Moscow



secret weakness of the Leopard II tank was no secret to the Russians before it began coming off the assembly lines in 1979.

The story of the trial of a man tempted at self-treatment, albeit one doomed to failure, on the part of the immature personality.

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ny penalties for late delivery, so they agreed among themselves to skip the "glow process" in which the plating is heated to 800 deg. C and exposed to it for 60 hours. This adds tensile strength. Believing that "the Bundeswehr is too stupid to notice anything," they sandblasted the plating as it was and released it for assembly.

The incident became known and a lot of people were fired, said Liebert, who then was a metalworker.

The Russians then told him to study mechanical engineering. Liebert, then 31, did exactly that, on a German government student allowance. He graduated, having specialised in material testing.

Everything worked like a charm, and when he needed steel samples — allegedly in connection with his studies — his card-playing friends were happy to oblige with discarded bits of the latest batch of armour plating.

He buried the samples in pre-arranged places where they were picked up by Soviet couriers and rushed to Moscow.

The head of personnel at one of the Thyssen companies, testifying as a witness, explained to the court how Liebert was able to obtain the samples: one of

his friends was a material and welding seam tester who marked pieces that passed the quality test with a chalk mark. He was able to pass scrap samples on to Liebert.

The friendship between the two continued after Liebert graduated with a diploma as a mechanical engineer.

Now he could no longer say that he needed the samples for his studies; so he said he was working for an engineering firm that was developing steel for tank armour and was hoping to arrange a big deal.

He asked his friends to help out with steel samples — especially the new HZB 20 and HZB 301 types. This is the steel used for the Leopard II's turrets and fronts, the most vulnerable parts of a tank. His friends were again happy to oblige.

In retrospect, it seems doubtful whether the Soviet spymasters were well advised to activate their sleeper.

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
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Defrocked: the Leopard II tank.

(Photo: Wernk)

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Beware of East Berlin agents, industrialists warned



Kurt Rebmann... watch the secretaries' boyfriend.

(Photo: dpa)

The recruiting approach for West Germans to spy for the GDR is always the same: they are either accosted during visits to East Germany or are recruited through advertisements of seemingly innocuous companies.

Secretaries, who are usually rather productive sources of information, are approached by male recruiters pretending to be in love with them.

Others collect industrial secrets, and save the GDR an estimated DM300m a year in research costs.

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Allgemeine Zeitung


sorted to violence in pursuit of their political goals.

Independent terrorist groupings were increasingly prepared to undermine the authority of the judiciary and executive branch and thus also undermine democracy.

Rebmann, whose predecessor was killed by terrorists in 1977, said that we must learn from the 1920s and 1930s and check any development that could lead to violence and anarchy.

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